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Abstract
Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is infrastructure less, dynamic, decentralized network of wireless mobile nodes. Although
MANET is very much useful but it suffers from different security issues. Dropping packets by selﬁsh nodes is one of them. Presence
of selﬁsh nodes in MANET may damage the entire communication system. So, it is highly required to detect those selﬁsh nodes
and promote cooperation in MANET. Here, a new game theoretic scheme has been proposed for selﬁsh node detection in MANET.
Besides detection of selﬁsh nodes, using Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF), data packets will be transmitted from source to destination
node through least cost path only. Due to the presence of selﬁsh nodes in the network, if a path has been broken, then the next best
path will be automatically selected for data transmission. So, this scheme guarantees secure low cost data transfer and smallest
amount of idle time.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Eleventh International Multi-Conference on Information
Processing-2015 (IMCIP-2015).
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1. Introduction
MANET can be deﬁned as a network that has large number of autonomous or free nodes. It is autonomous,
decentralized, ﬂexible and supports multi hop routing. Besides numerous advantages, MANET has some
vulnerabilities, such as lack of centralized authority, limited bandwidth, limited power supply, limited availability of
resource, dynamic topology, routing overhead etc. MANET is based on the assumption that each node is co-operative
and trusted. But in reality, some of the nodes may act selﬁshly. These selﬁsh nodes use the network and receive
services from other nodes but they do not cooperate with other nodes of the network. The establishment of multi-hop
routes in an ad hoc network relies on the fact that every node will forward packets for one another. However, a selﬁsh
node, in order to conserve its limited energy resources, could decide not to behave cooperatively. If every node of the
network decides to act selﬁshly, then the entire network could be collapsed.
Game theory tries to focus at the relationship between the participants in a particular game model and then predicts
their optimal decisions. It can be used to ﬁnd out how the performance of MANET may be affected by the selﬁsh
nature of nodes. A game is made up of three components: a set of players, a set of strategies or actions and utility
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +919433129635.
E-mail address: akoushik@ieee.org
 015 The Authors. Published by Elsevi r B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
eer-rev ew under responsibility of organizing committee of the Eleventh International Multi-Conference on Information 
Processing-2015 (IMCIP-2015)
93 Debjit Das et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  54 ( 2015 )  92 – 101 
Fig. 1. Pay off matrix of the game.
function or payoffs. In MANET, the players are the nodes of the network. The actions are the different alternatives
available to each player. When each player chooses an action, the resulting action proﬁle determines the outcome of
the entire game. Using game model, steady-state conditions known as Nash equilibrium can be identiﬁed.
Effect of Selﬁsh node in MANET can be described using Payoff matrix1. In Payoff matrix, a Nash equilibrium can
be deﬁned as a set of strategies, one strategy for each player, such that no player of the game has incentive to alter its
strategy given what other players of the game are doing. An outcome of a game is said to be Pareto optimal if no other
outcome of the game provides every player of the game at least same beneﬁt while providing at least anyone player
better payoff. To illustrate this, a network of three users can be considered. Each user either shares its ﬁles with other
users or not. So, strategy set of each player becomes Share, Not share. Here, it is assumed that each player will be
beneﬁtted by 2 units for every other user which shares ﬁles and a player expends 3 units for sharing its own. So, the
payoff matrix becomes as shown in Fig. 1.
From the payoffs it is observed that the best choice for each player is to not share. The unique Nash Equilibrium is
not share for each user i.e. (Not share, Not share, Not share). In this case the Nash Equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
Only when each player shares i.e. (Share, Share, Share), will make all three players payoffs better than the Nash
Equilibrium action tuple. Here, we can see that if any player behaves selﬁshly and denies to share then it will affect
the total system. All the nodes will be beneﬁtted if and only if they are cooperative in nature.
2. Related Works
In the work of Feng, Zhu and Luo2, a game theory based cooperative incentive mechanism has been proposed.
The utility function includes three parameters – dependence, cooperation capability, reputation. The objective of the
cooperative incentive mechanism is to maximize the utility function. Wu, J S and Huey3 considered a MANET with n
number of nodes connected by wireless links, to ﬁnd out the best route from the source node to the destination node.
Wu and Yu4 described AODV and proposed a threshold based approach to increase the detection rate of selﬁsh nodes.
Buttyan and Hubaux5 proposed a stimulation approach based on a virtual currency, called nuglets. This is a charge and
reward scheme. One of the techniques for providing incentives for nodes to behave in cooperative manner is reputation
based scheme6. In this mechanism, each node gains reputation through providing services to other nodes. Tit for Tat7
is another model which has been proposed to solve the problem of selﬁsh nodes in routing and packet forwarding.
In another work8 the authors proposed a game theoretic strategy called ERTFT for promoting cooperation between
nodes in MANET. Usha and Radha9 proposed a cooperative approach to detect misbehaving nodes in MANET using
Multi hop acknowledgement scheme. Komathy and Narayanasamy10 evaluated the concept of trust with the help of a
distributed framework using a new idea called evolutionary game theory.
Above papers deals with the problem of selﬁsh nodes and malicious nodes and promotes cooperation. But these
papers did not consider the cost factor in their mechanism. Therefore to detect selﬁsh nodes in MANET a new game
theoretic model has been proposed in this paper. This scheme uses Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF) which ensures that
data packet will be transferred through least cost path only. Using Payoff matrix we can prove that a node will be
beneﬁtted if and only if it is cooperative in nature.
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3. Proposed Scheme
Here, a new game theoretic scheme has been proposed for selﬁsh node detection in MANET. This is based on
modiﬁed AODV routing protocol. Additionally using Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF) data packets will always be sent
from source node to destination node through least cost path only. Using payoff matrix we can show that a node will be
beneﬁtted if and only if it is cooperative in nature. Otherwise, after a preﬁx threshold limit is crossed the misbehaving
or selﬁsh node will be removed from the network. So, this scheme guarantees low cost data transfer and smallest
amount of idle time and promotes cooperation in MANET.
3.1 Deﬁnition of game
A game has three basic components: a set of players, a set of actions or strategies and utility function.
So, a game can be expressed as, G = (P; S;U)
• P represents set of players or nodes.
• S is the strategy space of a node.
• U is the utility function of a node.
Players: players are the decision makers in the game model. There are two or more decision makers in each game
known as the players.
Strategy: Strategy refers to the rules of selection of action used by the players.
Utility: Each player will have a range of possible outcomes and a clear order of preference based on the payment.
The goal of the game is to maximize the utility function of each player.
Game theory can be divided into a cooperative game or a non cooperative game. In this paper the game theoretic
model is a non cooperative game model.
3.2 Network model and assumptions
Network model and assumptions are as follows:
• A mobile ad hoc network with n nodes connected by wireless links has been considered here.
• It is assumed that in this network all links are bi-directional and symmetric.
• Here, it is assumed that some nodes in the network may be selﬁsh but not malicious.
• For a node, only forwarding a packet consumes resources, but receiving or disposing a packet cost no resources.
• It is assumed that every node has its unique id, Cost Factor (CF) and own routing table.
3.3 Modiﬁed AODV model
In this paper focus has been given on AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Vector) routing protocol to propose the selﬁsh
node detection methods and to transfer packets through least cost path. This scheme modiﬁes the existing AODV
routing protocol model. So, ﬁrst of all this modiﬁed AODV routing protocol will be introduced.
In this modiﬁed AODV routing protocol, ﬁve control messages are used to establish and maintain the transmission
paths. These control messages are – Hello message (Hello), Route Request message (RREQ), Route Reply message
(RREP), Route Error message (RERR) and Acknowledgement message (ACK). The packet format of message is
shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Packet format used.
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It is assumed that each node has its unique id and its Cost Factor (CF). This cost factor (CF) of a node is based on the
distance to neighbor nodes, power available, bandwidth, range and some other factors. If CF of a node is X, it means
that for forwarding a packet the source node will have to pay this node the cost X. Each node has its own routing table.
3.4 Importance of proposed scheme using payoff matrix
It can be proved that a node in this mobile ad hoc network will be beneﬁtted if and only if it is cooperative in nature.
This can be proved using payoff matrix. Otherwise, after a preﬁx threshold limit is crossed the misbehaving or selﬁsh
node will be removed from the network.
A game is deﬁned as G = (P; S;U).
Here, P = n number of players or nodes of the network.
S = Strategy set of a node, i.e. Si is the strategy space of node i or set of strategies available for node i .
U = Utility function of a node or payoff of a node. So, Ui represents the utility function or payoff of node i .
From n number of nodes of the ad hoc network we can isolate any pair of nodes and then study the interaction
between them, so, in this way it becomes a two-player game. In a two player game, two nodes send a packet to each
other and then decide whether to forward or drop their respective packets. Then this game strategy will be repeated
iteratively. We can denote a node i , where i belongs to {Node 1, Node 2}, and −i represents its neighbor nodes.
So, in this two player game,
Players: Two nodes namely Node1, Node2.
Strategy: Either forward or drop packet of other nodes.
Utility or Payoff: We assume the reward or beneﬁt a node receives if its packet is relayed by other node is Eg , i.e.
Energy gain of a node is Eg if its packet is forwarded by other node. Similarly, we assume the packet relaying cost of
a node is El , i.e. if a node relay the packet of other node, then the amount of energy loss of the relaying node is El .
Eg is always greater than El , i.e. Eg > El .
So, when both nodes decide to forward each other’s packet then payoff for each node is Eg − El . When, one player
forwards other players packet, but second player denies to do so, then payoff of ﬁrst node will be −El and payoff of
second player will be Eg . When no player is interested in forwarding other player’s packet then payoff for both of
them will be zero, i.e. they are not interested in playing the game. So, the single stage payoff matrix of this two player
game is shown in ﬁgure Fig. 3.
So, from the above pay off matrix, we can say that if the game is played only once, then the condition for achieving
Nash Equilibrium will be {Drop, Drop}. So, in the single stage game we cannot achieve cooperation. But actually in a
mobile ad hoc network, all nodes periodically choose an action, and therefore it becomes an inﬁnitely repeated game
for all participating nodes of the game. So, in this inﬁnitely repeated game, each node has to consider its future payoff.
If a node behave selﬁshly then it will be punished by other nodes of the network in future, and therefore the selﬁsh
node will be removed from the network. So, in inﬁnitely repeated game, cooperation can be achieved. If each player
is cooperative in the network then it will be beneﬁtted for entire game as well as for each player of the game. From
the payoff matrix we can see, if both players forward each other’s packets, then payoff for each node will be Eg - El ,
which is the actual best case for the game or the network. So, this game promotes cooperation in the network.
Similarly, on the other side, let us consider two nodes, one normal node and other one is selﬁsh node. Each node is
an intermediate node of a path from source node to destination node. Let the cost factor of both nodes is Xi and actual
Fig. 3. Single stage payoff matrix of 2-player game.
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Fig. 4. Payoffs of 2 intermediate nodes in terms of cost.
relaying cost of the intermediate node is Yi . It means for forwarding a packet each intermediate node will receive
Xi and its expense for forwarding is Yi . So, for a normal node, since it forwards the packet of other node, it will
receive a payoff of Xi − Yi . But a selﬁsh node will not receive a payoff if it does not forward other node’s packet.
So, we can say forwarding a packet is beneﬁcial for each node since Xi is greater than Yi . So, the payoff of both
intermediate nodes in terms of cost are shown in Fig. 4.
So, from the above ﬁgure it is clear that payoff for a normal node is always Xi −Yi , since it always forwards packet
of other node. But a selﬁsh node will receive Xi − Yi payoff when it forwards packet of other node and it will not
receive any payoff when it does not forward. Since Xi − Yi > 0, so, we can say that forwarding other node’s packet is
always beneﬁcial.
So, the utility function of an intermediate node, Ui = Xi − Yi , is better when the node forwards packet of other
node. Thus, it promotes cooperation in the network.
3.5 Types of misbehavior of selﬁsh node
In this modiﬁed AODV routing protocol, the possible misbehavior of the selﬁsh node are as follows:
• Not forwarding RREQ messages.
• Not forwarding Data messages.
• Not forwarding ACK messages.
• Not sending Hello messages.
• Delayed forwarding RREQ messages.
• Not forwarding RREP messages.
Among these misbehaviors of selﬁsh nodes, here we will focus on the ﬁrst three cases, i.e. Not forwarding RREQ
message, Not forwarding Data message, and Not forwarding ACK messages, since these types of misbehavior of
selﬁsh node is mostly responsible for the degradation of performance of MANET.
3.6 Selﬁsh node detection algorithms
• Selﬁsh Node detection algorithm for Not forwarding of RREQ message:
In AODV routing protocol, ﬁrst of all each node sends Hello message to all of its one hop neighbor nodes. Then each
node stores the id’s of the nodes from which they received the Hello messages, in its routing table. During creation of
a path, source node checks its routing table ﬁrst. Then if the destination node is not present in its routing table, it starts
sending RREQ message to each of its one hop neighbor nodes. Each normal neighbor node will again rebroadcast
it to their one hop neighbor nodes and it continues until the destination node is reached. Since the source node is
also a one hop neighbor node of each of these nodes so it will receive the same. Each time the RREQ message is
delivered with the sender node’s id. So, source node can check the character of each of its neighbor nodes. If it has not
received the same RREQ from one of its neighbor nodes within a preﬁxed timeout then that node will be marked as
potential misbehaving node. This process continues repeatedly. Each normal intermediate node after receiving RREQ,
rebroadcasts this RREQ to all of its one hop neighbor nodes. Consequently the node from which it received RREQ,
will also receive the same RREQ from this node and it makes the node to be marked as a normal node. In later stages,
if any node denies forwarding this RREQ message, then that node’s previous node will not receive the same. Hence, the
node that is denying will be marked as potential misbehaving node. For each potential misbehaving node, a threshold
value is maintained. If the number of times a node is marked as a potential misbehaving node exceeds this threshold
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Table 1. Selﬁsh node detection algorithm for Not forwarding of RREQ.
limit, then that node will be ﬂagged as selﬁsh node and this information will be sent to all other nodes of the network.
The detail algorithm is given in Table 1.
• Selﬁsh Node Detection Algorithm for Not forwarding of Data packet:
After some transmission paths are established, they will be ranked according to their Total Cost Factor. The path
with least total cost will be ranked as 1 and so on. Then, when the preset time out for path establishment is over, data
packet transmission will be started from source node to destination node through the rank 1 path. Data packet along
with the data contains the following information,
• Source node’s address.
• Destination node’s address.
• Transmission path sequence, i.e. the order of nodes in the transmission path from source to destination node.
• Current Sender Node, i.e. the node of the transmission path which is holding the data packet currently.
• Next Receiver Node, i.e. the node of the transmission path where the data packet has to be sent by the current
sender node.
This detection algorithm can be explained with an example. Let, the data transmission path is A-B-C-D-E, where
the source node is A and destination node is E. The transmission path sequence is stored in the data packet. Initially
Current Sender Node (CSN) is set as A and Next Receiver Node (NRN) is B. When data packet reaches B, then the
value of CSN and NRN will be modiﬁed. CSN will be set as B and NRN will be set as C. In this way, the value of
CSN and NRN will be modiﬁed whenever data packet reaches a new intermediate node of the transmission path. Now,
suppose B denies to forward the data packet. So, the value stored in NRN i.e. C will not receive the packet. After
waiting for a preﬁxed time out, if the node stored in NRN is unable to receive the data packet, then the node stored in
CSN will be marked as potential misbehaving node. So, in this case B will be marked as potential misbehaving node.
Otherwise the process continues. If no selﬁsh node is present then ﬁnally when D successfully sends data packet to E,
then value of CSN becomes E, and value of NRN is also E, since this is the last node of the transmission path. When
this happens, i.e. CSN and NRN are same, it indicates successful data transmission from source node to destination
node. The detail algorithm is given in Table 2.
• Selﬁsh Node Detection algorithm for Not forwarding of ACK packet:
During data transmission when data packet reaches the destination node, the destination node replies with an
acknowledgementmessage ACK. This ACK packet is forwarded in the reverse order by the intermediate nodes through
the same path via which the data packet is sent to the destination node. Finally, when the ACK packet is sent back to
the source node then the source node will be informed that data packet has successfully reached the destination node.
But, in this process if ACK packet is lost or dropped due to the presence of selﬁsh node, then it will not reach source
node. After waiting for a preﬁxed timeout, since the source node has not received the ACK packet, so, the source node
will again send the same data packet. Thus, destination node will receive same data packet again. This will inform
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Table 2. Selﬁsh node detection algorithm for not forwarding data packet.
Table 3. Selﬁsh node detection algorithm for not forwarding of ACK packet.
destination node that the ACK packet it sent was not received by the source node. So, this time destination node will
again send ACK packet and will check the intermediate nodes to ﬁnd out the misbehaving node which drops the ACK
packet. For this purpose, the ACK packet has two additional ﬁelds in it. One ﬁeld, CACK , stores the Current Sender
Node which is holding the ACK packet and another one is Next Receiver Node NACK , where the ACK packet has
to be sent. Initially CACK is the destination node. This scheme is similar to the scheme used for detection of selﬁsh
nodes not forwarding data packet. When ACK reaches source node, it conﬁrms that data packet has been successfully
delivered to the destination node. The detail algorithm is given in Table 3.
3.7 Working principle of proposed scheme
According to the modiﬁed AODV routing protocol, initially each individual node of the MANET will broadcast
the Hello message (Hello) to all of its neighbor nodes. Each normal node will send this Hello message to all the
neighbor nodes which are directly connected to it. After receiving the Hello message, all the neighbor nodes will add
the information of the nodes which sent the Hello message to their respective routing table. Each node has its routing
table which stores the detailed information of its neighbor nodes, i.e. ids of its neighbor nodes along with their cost
factors (CF).
If a source node wants to send data to the destination node, then ﬁrst of all the source node will check its routing
table to search the destination node. If the destination node is not present in the routing table of the source node, then
the source node will broadcast a RREQ message to all of its neighbor nodes. Each of its neighbor nodes will also
rebroadcast the received RREQ message to their neighbor nodes. This process continues in this way again and again
until the destination node is reached. When the destination node receives the RREQ messages sent by its neighbors,
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the destination node will reply a RREP message to its neighbor node from which RREQ message is received by the
destination node. In this process when destination node ﬁrst responds with RREP message, this RREP message will
be sent to its neighbor node from which the destination node received the RREQ message and then the cost factor
of that node will be set as the Total Cost Factor (TCF) of the path. Then that node will also send the RREP message
reversely to its preceding neighbor node from which it received the RREQ message, according to the records stored in
its routing table. This time also when the RREP message reaches that preceding node, its CF will be added to the TCF
and new TCF will be set as the sum of the cost factors of the two nodes of the path. Then the node again transmits the
RREP message to its preceding node and this process continues in this way. Thus, when the RREP message reaches
the source node, the transmission path can be established and this path will be marked as a valid path.
In this way, RREQ messages can be sent to the destination node through various paths and for each path RREP
message can be sent back reversely from destination node to the source node. For each path when RREP message is
forwarded reversely to the source node, the CF of each node of that path will be added till the source node is reached.
Within a preset time out if X numbers of transmission paths are established then those paths will be saved as the
valid paths of the network for sending data from source node to destination node. When only ﬁrst path is created then
its TCF will be set as Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF). But when, another path will be created, then its TCF will be
compared to the value of LTCF. If the TCF of second path is lower than the value of LTCF, then this path will be stored
as Rank 1 path, and its TCF will be saved as LTCF and ﬁrst path will get Rank 2. Otherwise the ﬁrst path will remain
at Rank 1 and newly created path will get Rank 2. In this way the process continues, i.e. all the transmission paths will
be ranked according to their TCF. The path with Least Total Cost Factor (LTCF), will be marked as rank 1, the path
with second lowest TCF will be marked as rank 2 and so on.
During data transmission, for any reason, if a node in this transmission path is unable to communicate with its
neighbor node in this path, then that node will send a Route Error (RERR) message to the source node and remove all
the information belonged to that transmission path from its routing table.
Similarly, during data transmission it can be found that there are selﬁsh nodes present in the network. Selﬁsh nodes
of type – ‘Not forwarding RREQ packet’, do not forward RREQ message for other nodes, so transmission paths can
not be build through these nodes. Selﬁsh nodes of type – ‘Not forwarding Data packet’, may deny to forward data
packets for other nodes during data transmission. So, this type of selﬁsh nodes need to be detected using the previously
described algorithms. After some transmission paths are made, if it is found that a node is selﬁsh in nature, then all the
valid transmission paths are checked and if the selﬁsh node is found in any valid transmission path then that path will
be removed from the database and the remaining transmission paths will be re-ranked according to their TCF. LTCF
will be modiﬁed if required.
In MANET, each node has the capability to determine its own needs. So, each node can set the maximum price it is
willing to pay for packet transferring. This value is only known to source node S and it is denoted as Smax−pay. So,
whenever a path is being created and its TCF is being calculated, the TCF of that path will be checked at each stage
with the value of Smax−pay. At any stage if it is found that TCF of the path > Smax−pay , then that path will not be
formed further and will not be stored.
After the preset time out for path establishment is over, data packet transmission is started from source node towards
destination node through the rank 1 path. When data packet will reach the destination node, the destination node will
reply with an acknowledgement message ACK in the reverse order through the same path via which the data packet is
sent to the destination node. Finally, when the ACK packet reaches the source node, the source node will be informed
that data packet has successfully reached the destination node.
If S is the source node, which wants to send its data packets to the destination node T via some intermediate nodes,
then, the utility function of the source node S is as follows:
US = Smax−pay −
∑
CFSD (1)
where,
US is the utility function of the source node.
Smax−pay is the maximum amount the source node S can pay to the intermediate nodes of a transmission path for
transferring its data packets to destination node T .
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CFSD represents the cost factor of each intermediate node present in a transmission path from source node to
destination node.
Our main goal of this scheme is to detect selﬁsh nodes effectively and then to send data packets from source node to
destination node at lowest cost. So, we have to maximize the value of utility of the source node. For this, transmission
path which will maximize the value of utility of the source node to the highest level, will be chosen as the best
transmission path from source to destination node. So, among all the valid transmission paths, the path for which we
will get US−max , will be chosen as the Rank 1 transmission path, and data transmission will be started through that
path. Here, US−max denotes the maximum utility of the source node.
The detail algorithm of this proposed scheme is given in Table 4.
Table 4. Algorithm of the proposed scheme.
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3.8 Advantages of proposed scheme
Advantages of this proposed scheme are as follows
• This scheme effectively detects selﬁsh nodes.
• Using LTCF, data packets will be sent from source node to destination node through least cost path only. So, this
scheme guarantees lowest cost expenditure for packet transmission.
• Due to the presence of selﬁsh nodes in the network, if a path has been broken, then the next best available path
will be automatically selected for data transmission. So, this scheme guarantees smallest amount of idle time.
4. Conclusion
Presence of selﬁsh node in MANETmay damage the entire communication system. So, it is required to detect those
selﬁsh nodes and promote cooperation in MANET. In this paper we have proposed a scheme that can efﬁciently detect
selﬁsh nodes in MANET and ensures that data packet will be transmitted from source node to destination node via
least cost path only. This scheme also guarantees the smallest amount of idle time and greater availability as in case of
a broken path, the next best path will be automatically selected for transmission on the basis of the ranking.
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